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The traditional doctrine that God is impassible (here, invulnerable to suffer-
ing) is subject to the objection that it is incompatible with belief that God is 
loving and compassionate. However, the doctrine that God is passible has 
grave difficulties as well. I argue that Christian believers should take an ana-
logical approach, by believing that God does something relevantly similar to 
loving us in a way that involves vulnerability to suffering, and thus conceiving 
of God as loving us in that way, while simultaneously believing that God is in 
fact impassible. I conclude with answers to several likely objections.
According to the theology of the early and medieval Christian church, as 
well as of the early Protestant reformers, God is “impassible,” meaning he 
cannot suffer and is not vulnerable to being affected by creatures.1 While 
this position was the nearly unanimous teaching of the Christian churches 
up until at least the nineteenth century, it is now often rejected in favor of 
the view that God suffers out of compassion for his creatures. Both po-
sitions come with costs for the theist. To assert that God is vulnerable to 
suffering seems to render him imperfect and perhaps even pathetic and 
worthy of pity. But to deny that God suffers in response to the suffering 
of his creatures seems to entail that God does not love his creatures in 
the fullest sense of the word. In this paper, I offer a mediating solution to 
this dilemma, one which involves a specific kind of appeal to analogy. If 
my strategy is satisfactory, it will not only resolve this particular dilemma 
regarding God’s passibility, but will also illuminate a generally applicable 
approach to tackling similar theological difficulties.
1. The Case for God’s Passibility
Numerous arguments have been proposed in support of the view that God 
suffers.2 However, in the interest of space I will focus on the one reason 
1More recently, the topic of God’s “impassibility” has been explored in terms of whether 
God experiences emotions. See especially Creel, Divine Impassibility; Sarot, God, Passibility and 
Corporeality; and Scrutton, Thinking through Feeling. I will not explicitly address that version 
of the debate here, though there is significant overlap between the two versions.
2For a good overview of the common arguments for passibility, see Marcel Sarot, God, 
Passibility and Corporeality, chapter 3.
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I find most compelling: that if God loves us, God must be vulnerable to 
suffering in response to our plight. By “suffering” here, I mean any qualita-
tively negative experience—anything felt by the subject as both unwanted 
and painful.3
One of the most prominent proponents of the view that God suffers is 
Jürgen Moltmann, who argues that if God loves us, he must suffer sym-
pathetically with us:
A God who is incapable of suffering is a being who cannot be involved. 
Suffering and injustice do not affect him. And because he is so completely 
insensitive, he cannot be affected or shaken by anything. . . . But the one who 
cannot suffer cannot love either.4
Similarly, Maldwyn Hughes asserts,
It is of the very nature of love to suffer when its object suffers loss, whether 
inflicted by itself or others. If the suffering of God be denied, then Christian-
ity must discover a new terminology and must obliterate the statement ‘God 
is love’ from its Scriptures.5
And John Macquarrie argues that “a God of love is inevitably vulnerable, 
for there is no love that does not suffer.”6 The idea here is that to love 
someone is to care about what happens to them, and this entails feeling 
dismayed when something seriously bad happens to them. It does not 
seem possible to truly love without being emotionally affected by the fate 
of the other. And so if God loves us, he must suffer when we are harmed. 
No claim is more central to the Christian conception of God than the claim 
that God loves us: the Christian scriptures assert that God is love (and 
not, by contrast, that God is power or knowledge). So if the doctrine that 
God is impassible seems to undermine the doctrine that God loves us, that 
seems like sufficient grounds for a Christian to reject the doctrine that God 
is impassible.
However, the impassibilist may object that the above argument rests 
on an inappropriate conception of love as applied to God. One might, for 
example, argue that God’s love consists simply in benevolence—that is, 
in willing and acting for the good of his creatures. Something like this 
position is suggested by Anselm’s account of God’s compassion in the 
Proslogion:
But how are You at once both merciful and impassible? For if You are im-
passible You do not have any compassion; and if You have no compassion 
Your heart is not sorrowful from compassion with the sorrowful, which is 
what being merciful is. . . . In fact, You are [merciful] according to our way 
of looking at things and not according to Your way. For when You look upon 
3In this I differ from Robin Cook, who takes “suffering” to indicate something more in-
tense (Divine Impassibility, Divine Love, 32).
4Moltmann, The Crucified God, 222.
5Hughes, What is the Atonement?, 94.
6Macquarrie, The Humility of God, 69.
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us in our misery it is we who feel the effect of Your mercy, but You do not 
experience the feeling. Therefore You are both merciful because You save the 
sorrowful and pardon sinners against You; and You are not merciful because 
You do not experience any feeling of compassion for misery.7
Anselm acknowledges that compassion entails suffering, and thus that 
an impassible God does not have compassion in the normal sense of the 
word. However, God’s actions are the sort which would naturally spring 
from compassion, and for that reason, we call God compassionate. One 
might take the same approach to interpreting the closely related claim that 
God loves us. On this view, God’s “love” consists simply in his benevolent 
actions and intentions toward us.
Alternately, if benevolence alone seems too cool-minded to constitute 
love in the truest sense of the word, the impassibilist could posit that God 
also desires union with us in the form of a mutually loving personal rela-
tionship.8 On this view, God both seeks our good, and seeks union with 
us, as in full-blooded human love, but it occasions no suffering in God 
when these things he desires do not come to pass. This is not because 
God is “unfeeling” in the sense some human beings are—in the sense that 
his love lacks depth. Rather, God is impassible because he is free from 
the imperfections which make vulnerability to suffering the unavoidable 
accompaniment of human love.
However, many passibilists oppose this position on the grounds that, 
if it describes a kind of love at all, it is at best an inferior sort of love. For 
example, Charles Hartshorne argues,
sympathetic dependence is a sign of excellence and waxes with every ascent 
in the scale of being. Joy calls for sympathetic joy, sorrow for sympathetic 
sorrow, as the most excellent possible forms of response to these states. The 
eminent form of sympathetic dependence can only apply to deity, for this 
form cannot be less than an omniscient sympathy, which depends upon and 
is exactly colored by every nuance of joy or sorrow anywhere in the world.9
Similarly, Richard Bauckham ascribes to Moltmann the view that
being affected by the beloved and therefore vulnerable to suffering is essen-
tial to what is best and most valuable in human love. Pathos is not a deficien-
cy of human love, which must be stripped from our concept of divine love, 
but is rather love’s greatness, without which it is not recognizably love.10
On this view, the highest form of love is not passionless benevolence; it’s 
the sort of love that involves vulnerability to suffering and some degree 
of dependence on the beloved for one’s happiness. And so it is this form 
7Anselm, Proslogion, c.viii, 91.
8Aquinas holds something like the position described here; see Stump, Wandering in Dark-
ness, chapter 5 for a detailed analysis of Aquinas’s views. Cook notes that while passibilists 
sometimes ascribe to their opponents the view that God’s love consists solely in benevolence, 
this is not the traditional impassibilist position (Divine Impassibility, Divine Love, 179–180).
9Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, 48.
10Bauckham, “In Defense of The Crucified God,” 96.
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of love which must be ascribed to God, rather than one of the less robust 
forms.
As Nicholas Wolterstorff argues in “Suffering Love,” to love in the 
fullest sense isn’t merely to be committed to certain policies with respect 
to the beloved, e.g., promoting their well-being. Someone who acts with 
perfect benevolence out of duty might perform the very same actions that 
a loving person would perform, but to act benevolently out of duty is 
precisely not to act out of love.11 To love someone is to care about them—to 
personally value their well-being. But once we see that love requires caring 
about the beloved in this way, Wolterstorff argues, it becomes impossible 
to make sense of the thought that a loving God could be invulnerable to 
suffering:
If, believing some state of affairs to be occurring, one values that occurrence, 
whether negatively or positively, then one is correspondingly delighted or 
disturbed. . . . Some might question this assumption. Can valuing not be 
existentially colorless? Can God not value justice and shalom in his creation 
while yet his awareness of its presence gives him not a flicker of delight nor 
his awareness of its absence a twinge of unhappiness? My answer is that I do 
not know how to envisage such a possibility. . . . It is true, of course, that one 
can evaluate things coolly and impartially. One can work in a farmer’s shed 
evaluating potatoes without valuing positively those to which one gives top 
grade or negatively those that one tosses out. But that is a different matter. 
Evaluating is not valuing.12
Some may find this argument uncompelling, but it strikes me as entirely 
conclusive. Like Wolterstorff, I simply do not understand what it could 
mean to value something if it doesn’t involve feeling happier when one 
has it, and less happy when one does not. Of course someone could judge 
a particular person or object to be objectively valuable, and act to preserve 
it on the basis of its value, without being sad to see it destroyed. But to 
imagine this scenario is to imagine someone who does not personally care 
about the person or object in question. And not to care about a person is 
also not to love them, except perhaps in a weakened sense of the word.
One might object that we can imagine someone who is less susceptible 
to grief and other emotions than the average person without thereby 
being less loving. For instance, suppose A is psychologically wired so as 
to be subject to less intense emotions than most people are, and that B is a 
normally emotional person. If A and B are both parents and treat their chil-
dren equally well, I would not want to conclude that A loves his children 
less than B loves his merely because A has less intense emotions regarding 
them. If we grant this point, then perhaps we can continue to imagine A’s 
emotional intensity turned further and further down, until it reaches zero, 
while still maintaining that he loves his children as much as B loves his.13
11Wolterstorff, “Suffering Love,” 226–227.
12Wolterstorff, “Suffering Love,” 227.
13My thanks to Mark Murphy for this objection.
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I have two responses to this objection. First, one reason we might not 
want to say of A that he is deficient in his love for his children is that his 
emotions regarding his children might have a perfectly normal intensity 
relative to the intensity of his emotions regarding threats to his own safety, 
the cancellation of his favorite TV show, and so on. And it seems plausible 
that love has more to do with the relative intensity of one’s emotions than 
with their absolute intensity. But someone who has no emotional suscep-
tibility at all would feel the same amount of grief at the death of his child 
as at the cancellation of his favorite TV show (i.e., none), and so cannot 
be said to love his child in the full sense of the word. Alternately, perhaps 
the reason we hesitate to infer from A’s having unusually muted emotions 
that he loves his children less than B loves his is that saying someone loves 
his children less than the normal amount is ordinarily a damning moral 
criticism, and A deserves no such criticism. If we could set aside any im-
plications of moral censure, perhaps we would think it appropriate to say 
that a man who grieves less intensely upon the death of his children loved 
them less. And so this thought experiment does not really seem to show 
that someone completely invulnerable to suffering could nonetheless love 
in the fullest sense of the word.
There is more that could be said here, but before addressing possible 
objections to the above argument, or considering what precise conclusions 
should be drawn from it, this is a good point at which to consider the case 
from the opposition.
2. The Case for God’s Impassibility
The thought that a loving God must be capable of suffering is an intui-
tively compelling one, so it is not surprising that the doctrine that God is 
passible has gained such wide acceptance in recent years. However, the 
detriments of this position are often underestimated.
The most decisive arguments for God’s impassibility stem from the 
classical doctrines of God’s timelessness and aseity. The argument from 
timelessness can be made as follows: if God is timeless, he must also be im-
mutable, and if God is immutable, then if he were to experience suffering, 
that suffering would have to be eternal.14 That is an appalling thought in it-
self, but what’s more, as Wolterstorff points out, if the life of believers after 
death consists in union with God, sharing his bliss, this seems to suggest 
that we will also share in God’s suffering for all eternity.15 All this seems 
both frightful and opposed to traditional teachings. The argument from 
aseity is even simpler: if one accepts that God is unconditioned by any-
thing outside himself, then it is impossible for God to be caused to suffer by 
any being outside himself, or to have emotional states that are determined 
14Classically, impassibility has often been paired with immutability for a different reason, 
because the claim that God is “impassible” has often been taken to mean that God does not 
experience changes in emotional state. However, that would not by itself establish that God is 
“impassible” in the sense of being invulnerable to suffering.
15Wolterstorff, “Suffering Love,” 211; see also Scrutton, “Divine Passibility,” 867–868. 
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by events in the world. And God, being perfect, surely will not have any 
source for suffering within himself either, so God does not suffer.
But while these two arguments are decisive for those who accept their 
premises, those who posit a suffering God generally reject the classical 
doctrines which serve as the premises for these arguments, and thus the 
above arguments will get little grip on many readers. So in what follows, 
I will focus on problems with the doctrine that God suffers which (in my 
view) ought to persuade even non-classical, personalist theists.
First, suffering is obviously an evil, and for that reason, vulnerability to 
suffering seems obviously to be an imperfection. Even if the source of the 
suffering is something good—for example, compassionate love—that does 
not affect what suffering is intrinsically, which is something bad. Suffering 
does play valuable roles in the lives of frail and fallible creatures like our-
selves: we need it in order to be warned away from greater harms, in order 
to mature, and so on. But it would be perverse to deny that suffering is, in 
itself, bad. It would also be a morally worrisome stance to take, since one 
who does not think suffering is intrinsically bad will see far less reason to 
avoid inflicting it on others. So to deny that suffering is intrinsically evil 
would be an unappealing way to defend God’s passibility.
One might object that God’s suffering in response to human suffering 
and sin does not entail any imperfection in God’s own essence: God’s suf-
fering is an imperfection in God’s “quality of life,” so to speak, but these 
sufferings are not part of God’s nature. However, for God to be vulnerable 
to suffering would be a fact about God’s nature, and not merely about 
God’s “quality of life.” And just as suffering is a paradigm example of 
an evil, vulnerability to suffering seems like a paradigm example of an 
imperfection. A God who can be made to suffer by his creatures is vul-
nerable to being harmed (however slightly) by his creatures, and this fact 
undermines God’s perfection.
The passibilist might object here that vulnerability to certain sorts of 
suffering is in fact a perfection (or at least one aspect of a perfection), rather 
than an imperfection. Consider, for comparison, the perfection of omni-
science. On a standard personalist conception of God, God’s omniscience 
is a sort of perfect epistemic responsiveness to how the world actually is.16 
God’s knowledge of the evil aspects of the world is thus no imperfection 
in God; on the contrary, God’s knowledge of evils is part of the perfection 
of omniscience. Similarly, the passibilist can argue that perfect love also 
involves a sort of responsiveness to how the world is—to how the objects 
of that love fare. Like God’s knowledge of evil, God’s feeling of sympa-
thetic grief at the suffering of his creatures is the appropriate response to 
16Classical theists like Aquinas would deny that God is in any way responsive to how the 
world is: God exists a se and is unaffected by any creature. On this view, God knows every-
thing, not as a response to the epistemically prior facts of the matter, but rather by virtue of 
being the source of all existing things at every moment (Summa Theologiae I q.14 a.5 and a.8). 
But since my aim is to address the passibility debate from a personalist perspective, I will 
ignore the classical position in what follows.
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evils outside himself. Thus although their objects are bad, these responses 
are good. And so they entail no imperfection in God, but by contrast are 
expressions of God’s perfection.
But while it might sound initially plausible, the analogy I just sketched 
between knowledge and feeling doesn’t work. God’s omniscient knowl-
edge of goods and evils alike is a perfection and not an imperfection 
because knowledge of evils really isn’t itself an evil. In human beings, 
knowledge of evils might cause the knower pain, or contribute to moral 
corruption, and in those cases, it is a cause of evils. But I can’t see any 
reason to think that knowledge of evils is intrinsically bad. The object of the 
knowledge is bad, of course, but the knowledge isn’t. And because knowl-
edge of evils isn’t itself an evil, God’s susceptibility to knowing evils isn’t 
an imperfection. By contrast, suffering is an evil—a paradigm example of 
an evil. And because suffering is an evil, susceptibility to suffering does 
constitute an imperfection. Thus even if the passibilist is right that perfect 
love requires vulnerability to suffering, that would not prove that God’s 
vulnerability to suffering is really no imperfection. Nothing could prove 
that. Instead, it would only prove that the perfection of invulnerability to 
suffering and the perfection of love are incompatible. If the passibilist is 
right that God’s love entails vulnerability to suffering, then it is impossible 
for God to be free of imperfections.
Now, if the only way to save the claim that God loves us is to abandon 
the claim that God is perfect, then perhaps that is the price we must pay. 
But it should at least strike us as costly. To ascribe imperfections to God is 
all very well and good for process theists like Charles Hartshorne—theists 
who have by all accounts left orthodox theology far behind. But most 
theists are—rightly, I think—unwilling to ascribe imperfections to God. 
To assert that God suffers is to abandon a very deep element of traditional 
theology: the claim that God is perfect qua being.
The thought that God suffers in his love for creatures also has some 
disturbing implications, as Richard Creel demonstrates. On the one hand, 
some passibilists take the position that God is affected emotionally to an 
extreme. Bertrand Brasnett, for example, states that those who turn away 
from God cause him “unending pain and enduring agony,”17 and Charles 
Hartshorne describes God as “the cosmic sufferer, who endures infinitely 
more evil than we can imagine.”18 After all, the reason for saying that God 
suffers is that it seems to be a necessary condition of God’s loving us. But 
God is not merely loving; God is infinitely or maximally loving. And so, 
if we follow the passibilist line of thought, it seems as if God must suffer 
more than any other being has ever suffered, because of the greatness of 
his love. But if we take passibilism to its natural conclusion in this way, 
the result is one that undermines religious faith. For one thing, as Creel 
17Brasnett, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 78.
18Hartshorne, Man’s Vision of God, 331.
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points out, such a suffering God would be the “highest object of pity,”19 
but “surely pity cannot be an appropriate feeling toward God unless our 
notions of God’s majesty and self-sufficiency are shown to be illogical.”20 
If one truly believed God to be in such a state of suffering, Creel notes, 
one would want to pray for him—but to whom could one pray in order 
to pray for God? What’s more, it would be possible for creatures to de-
liberately wound God, by doing things they know will make God suffer, 
and they could be victorious in this.21 While God could not be decisively 
defeated by his creatures, we would be able to make a dent in him, so to 
speak. And all of this seems contrary to an adequate concept of God as the 
proper object of worship.
Furthermore, Creel argues, if we try to address this problem by taking 
a more moderate passibilist stance, one on which God need not become an 
object of pity, that solution gives rise to other problems. Some passibilists 
argue that God does suffer, but temper this claim by asserting that this 
suffering is in some way transmuted into joy, or that it is drowned out 
by God’s perfect happiness, or else that God does suffer, but only to a 
modest extent. The problem with all such moderate views is that they un-
dermine the entire point of passibilism. If the reason we felt forced to say 
that God is vulnerable to suffering was so that we could understand God 
as genuinely loving us, then to double back and say that God nonetheless 
possesses perfect bliss, or that his sufferings are minor and calm, seems to 
entail that God genuinely loves us—but not very much.22
Most of the literature on whether God suffers takes one of the three 
approaches described above. Some, like Hartshorne and Brasnett, en-
dorse a strong doctrine of passibilism, thus allowing us to conceive of 
God as loving us deeply, at the expense of rendering God an object of 
pity. Others, like Creel in his earlier work, endorse a strong doctrine of 
impassibilism, arguing that God’s existence is one of perfect serenity, free 
of any suffering. This approach preserves a conception of God as perfect 
and self-sufficient, but at the risk of undermining the claim that God loves 
us. The third approach is to take a compromise position somewhere in 
the middle, attempting to avoid the disadvantages of both extremes—but 
such approaches also miss the advantages of both extremes. None of these 
existing approaches seems fully satisfactory.
3. A Solution to the Dilemma
So far, I have argued that there are good reasons both for thinking God can 
suffer and for thinking God cannot. On the one hand, we cannot imagine 
how love in the fullest sense could be compatible with a complete absence 
of grief when harm comes to the beloved. On the other hand, to posit 
19Creel, Divine Impassibility, 124.
20Creel, Divine Impassibility, 123.
21Creel, Divine Impassibility, 126.
22Creel, Divine Impassibility, 132–139.
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that God is vulnerable to suffering renders God imperfect and has various 
distressing consequences for the believer. Each reader will probably feel 
that one of the sides of this dilemma is more acceptable than the other, if 
it comes to that. But what I have wanted to emphasize is that each side of 
the dilemma has a real theological cost—a cost it would be better not to 
have to pay.
However, the dilemma I have sketched is entirely avoidable. We can 
take the claim that God loves us to be analogical, in a specific way I will 
sketch out here, and doing so will allow us to affirm everything we’d like 
to affirm, without undermining our commitment either to God’s love or 
to God’s perfection.
Of course, the claim that we speak analogically of God is hardly a new 
and original one in the Western philosophical and theological traditions. 
Indeed, some sort of appeal to analogy is one of the most familiar responses 
to theological quandaries. The approach I’ll be laying out in what follows 
is partly inspired by Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy: like Aquinas, I argue 
that we should take certain words to have a different sense when said of 
God than when said of creatures. However, the analogical strategy I offer 
here is far less theoretically loaded than Aquinas’s: it does not have em-
bedded within it the substantial (and highly controversial) metaphysical 
and theological premises that Aquinas’s account relies on. Accordingly, 
the analogical approach I propose here could be employed by classical 
and personalist theists alike. On the other hand, this approach is plagued 
by none of the imprecision about what exactly is being asserted that some-
times hampers other similarly minimalistic appeals to analogy.23
First, I will take as a premise Wolterstorff’s point that I cannot conceive 
of anyone genuinely valuing or caring about another without being sus-
ceptible to grief if the other is harmed. And as a consequence, I will follow 
Moltmann and Hartshorne in affirming that the highest form of love I am 
able to conceive of is a sort of love that renders the lover vulnerable to suf-
fering. This does not entail, however, that the actual highest form of love is 
one that renders the lover vulnerable to suffering: the actual highest form 
of love may be a form I am unable to conceive of.
What I mean by saying I can “conceive” of something meeting a certain 
description is that I have some positive sense of what it would be like 
for something to meet that description which goes beyond understanding 
23I am thinking here of the sort of criticism of appeals to analogy raised by William Alston 
in “Irreducible Metaphors in Religious Language.” Alston argues that those who appeal to 
irreducible analogy or metaphor are often guilty of a hand-waving imprecision that serves to 
disguise a lack of any coherent position. To put his point in terms of our current topic, when 
a claim like “God loves us” is paired with the caveat that it is merely analogical, its actual 
content becomes entirely indeterminate. If pressed to settle on a determinate content, Alston 
argues, the advocate of analogy generally ends up either covertly supplying a non-analogical 
explanation of the purportedly irreducibly analogical claim, or endorsing only a claim like 
“God is similar in some way to a being who loves us,” which is so empty of content as to 
be religiously useless (31–35). While I cannot address Alston’s arguments directly in this 
paper, the analogical account I offer here is neither imprecise about what it is claiming nor 
effectively empty of content, and so it is not defeated by Alston’s objections.
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the meanings of the component parts of that description. Furthermore, 
my understanding of what it would mean for something to meet the de-
scription cannot be purely negative, purely extrinsic, or purely irreducibly 
analogical, because those kinds of content are compatible with a total 
failure to know “what it would be like.”
For example, suppose someone informs me that a certain delicacy 
“tastes like fried liver, but good.” I can conceive of something tasting like 
liver, and I can conceive of something tasting good, but I am unable to con-
ceive of something that both tastes like liver and tastes good. Although I’m 
told this dish tastes similar to liver, I have no guesses as to which specific 
taste-properties of liver that analogical description is intended to express, 
because the only candidate taste-properties I can think of either don’t taste 
like liver, or don’t taste good. And so the claim that this dish tastes “similar 
to liver” is irreducibly analogical for me: I understand the similarity claim 
in the abstract, but do not know what the specific property is in virtue of 
which that similarity holds. The only other ways I could try to flesh out 
what it would be like for something to taste “like fried liver, but good” 
are either negative claims (presumably it doesn’t taste foul and musty), or 
extrinsic claims (presumably it would lead me to describe it as “tasting 
like liver, but good” if I tried it). But to be able to genuinely conceive of 
something’s both tasting like liver and tasting good, I need some positive, 
intrinsic, non-analogical idea about what that might be like, and that is what 
I lack. Nonetheless, I can’t rule out the possibility that there is a food that 
would taste like liver and yet taste good to me, even though I cannot pres-
ently conceive of such a thing.
To return to the topic at hand, I can conceive of forms of love that 
don’t involve vulnerability to suffering—pure benevolence and desire for 
union, for example. But any such form of love I can conceive of seems less 
loving than a form of love consisting of benevolence, desire for union, 
and emotional vulnerability to the well-being of the beloved such that the 
lover will grieve if the beloved is harmed. I can construct no positive con-
ception of a form of love which involves no vulnerability to suffering and 
yet isn’t inferior qua love to the highest forms of human love I know. Some 
such form of love may nonetheless be possible, but I can only posit it in 
an abstract way: I can say that perhaps there is a form of love that meets 
that description, but as in the liver case, I can frame no positive, intrinsic, 
non-analogical conception of what that might be.
Given this premise, what I propose is that we take the claim that God 
loves us to be analogical, by which I mean that we take it to involve an 
implicit and ineliminable appeal to similarity. Specifically, take “love*” to 
refer to love of the sort that involves valuing and caring for the beloved in 
such a way as to involve vulnerability to suffering. While the term “love” 
has different senses, love* is the highest and best form of love I can con-
ceive of. My proposal is that the believer accept the following set of claims:
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(G1) Love* entails vulnerability to suffering.
(G2) God is not vulnerable to suffering, and thus does not love*.
(G3) However, God has something importantly and relevantly similar 
to love*, so much so that to think of God as loving* us is to get 
something importantly right about God, even though it is also 
partly incorrect.
(G4) Human beings are unable to fully isolate the truth in the concep-
tion of God as loving* us, or to fully tease apart the aspects of the 
claim that God loves* us which are true from the aspects which 
are false, in such a way as would render unnecessary any reliance 
on the muddled, partly-true claim that God loves* us.
(G5) Therefore we ought to (at least for certain purposes) conceive of 
God as loving* us, while recognizing that this representation does 
not fully align with the truth about God.
On this view, the closest we can get to the truth when we think of God 
is to think of God as loving* us. And yet it is not true that God loves* 
us. God is similar in some important respects to one who loves* us—so 
similar that we are best off simply thinking of God as loving* us—but we 
ought to append to this conception a sort of caveat: “but not in the way 
I understand.” Thus we conceive of God as being emotionally affected 
by what his creatures do and experience, insofar as such a conception is 
necessary for us to conceive of God as deeply loving his creatures, but we 
do not believe that God literally suffers. Rather, what we think is that a 
description of God as having the sort of love which involves vulnerability 
to grief has some important analogy to the truth about God. We trust that 
there is something fundamentally appropriate about conceiving of God 
as experiencing grief on our behalf, but also hold in mind that it isn’t lit-
erally true that God suffers in any sense of the term we understand, and 
thus that not all the things which a statement like “x loves me” ordinarily 
entails actually apply in the case of God.24
I will flesh some aspects of this position out more fully in Section 4. But 
it is already possible to see how this position resolves our dilemma. On 
the one hand, the impassibilist’s worries are resolved straightforwardly, 
because my position entails that God is impassible and does not suffer. 
Therefore, we escape all the undesirable consequences of passibilism: the 
undermining of God’s perfection, God’s being made an object of pity, etc.
On the other hand, the problem we faced on the pro-passibility side of 
the dilemma stemmed specifically from our inability to conceive of God 
24My position here is reminiscent of the approach taken by many early Christian writers 
with respect to biblical ascriptions of emotions like anger and jealousy to God. For example, 
Origen argues that we should not take biblical descriptions of God as “angry” literally, be-
cause God is not subject to passions like anger (Homilies on Jeremiah, 18.6.7). Instead, the bible 
employs such anthropomorphic descriptions only as a way of “condescending” to human 
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as fully loving us without vulnerability to suffering. When Wolterstorff 
asks, “Can valuing not be existentially colorless?,” he does not respond 
by demonstrating the impossibility of such a thing. Instead, his response 
is, “I do not know how to envisage such a possibility.” Now, Wolterstorff 
quite reasonably intends this to function as part of an argument for saying 
that God is vulnerable to suffering and that the doctrine of impassibility is 
false. But it seems to me that “I do not know how to envisage such a possi-
bility”—i.e., “I cannot conceive of that”—is in fact the strongest conclusion 
we’re entitled to draw. It’s true that in some cases, “I cannot conceive of x” 
is at least strong evidence for “x is incoherent and thus impossible.” But 
that move is not justified when it’s God we’re talking about. We cannot 
reasonably claim to know that it is impossible for God—a being vastly 
greater than and vastly unlike us—to truly value a thing without being 
vulnerable to suffering. And so the fact that we cannot conceive of God 
as valuing us without being vulnerable to suffering, when joined with the 
premise that God does indeed value us, does not entail that God is vulner-
able to suffering. It may be that we are simply incapable of conceiving of 
God as he is.
One could object that the connection between valuing and vulnerability 
to suffering is an analytic one, and thus that we can know with certainty 
that it is impossible for anyone, even God, to value without being vul-
nerable to suffering. Indeed, passibilists like Hartshorne and Moltmann 
sometimes seem to suggest this. But that move would only shift the 
ground of the debate slightly. To this latter position, the impassibilist can 
respond that one cannot claim to know decisively that it is impossible for 
God to shmalue without being vulnerable to suffering, where shmaluing is 
an act similar to valuing in all those respects which are important to us, but 
which does not entail vulnerability to suffering.25 And the impassibilist 
could quite reasonably insist that the true highest form of love—a form of 
limitations (18.6.4); describing God as angry is useful for encouraging the childish and way-
ward to “convert and become better” (18.6.7). See Mark Sheridan, Language for God in Patristic 
Tradition, esp. chapters 1 and 5, for a fuller account of this interpretive tradition. Like Origen, 
I think a conception of God as having passions (e.g., grief) can be religiously useful, even if it 
is inaccurate. However, Origen takes this stance mainly as a way of explaining away troubling 
biblical descriptions of God as angry. While he must allow that such conceptions of God have 
some purpose, he doesn’t actually want his hearers to conceive of God as angry, any more 
than he wants them to believe that God is angry. By contrast, I propose that all believers, not 
only the childish and wayward, conceive of God as subject to passions like grief, even though 
I agree with Origen that we should not believe that God is subject to passions.
25This suggestion is inspired by the approach taken by Swinburne with respect to the 
question of whether God is a person (The Coherence of Theism, 268–278; see also 60–61). On 
Swinburne’s account, when a word “W” is used analogically, it has its meaning loosened to 
eliminate one of its normal entailments or criteria, but the word may still only be applied to 
things more similar to standard instances of W things than to standard instances of non-W 
things. However, unlike Swinburne, I do not take it to be possible for us to infer all the other 
normal entailments from a claim employing an analogical term. Paul Helm also makes a 
similar suggestion, arguing that God could have “themotions,” where a themotion is “as 
close as possible to the corresponding human emotion . . . except that it cannot be an affect” 
(“The Impossibility of Divine Passibility,” 140).
401THE PASSIBILITY OF GOD: A PLEA FOR ANALOGY
love which surpasses human conception—is one that involves shmaluing 
rather than valuing.26
Given that we are discussing God, whose nature and operations will 
necessarily be mysterious to such imperfect creatures as ourselves, the 
passibilist cannot prove that for God, love must entail suffering. Rather, 
the most compelling and persuasive version of the passibilist case involves 
only an observation about ourselves: that we cannot conceive of God as 
fully loving us in the deepest sense without conceiving of God as vulner-
able to suffering. And this consideration is satisfied by the position I have 
sketched in (G1) through (G5) above: that God does something relevantly 
similar to loving* us (that is, loving us in the highest and best sense of the 
word we know), and hence that we should conceive of him as loving* us. 
The sorts of passibilist arguments I have discussed here, those that rely on 
our intuitions about what is required for love, do not necessitate that we 
believe that God is vulnerable to suffering, but only that we think of him as 
vulnerable to suffering, and those two things can come apart.
4. Objections and Replies
Objection 1: The Analogy Solution is Inconsistent
My proposal seems to involve inconsistency or cognitive dissonance. The 
proposal is not itself inconsistent, because it is possible to think of God as 
loving* us despite believing that God does not love* us, and doing so does 
not require one to believe contradictory things. However, my proposal 
requires the subject to adopt inconsistent attitudes. I am proposing that 
one conceive of God as loving* us, not in the fanciful way in which I might 
conceive of a pansy as having a face, but in a veridical way: I am proposing 
that we think of God as loving* us when we are trying to think of God as 
he is. And yet I am committed to denying that God really does love* us.
It is true that my position involves a degree of internal inconsistency, or 
at least a real internal tension. One symptom of this is that one is likely to 
be able to do only one of these two things at a time: when one is thinking 
of God as loving* us, one is not holding in mind that God does not really 
26While the only pro-passibilism argument I am addressing in this paper is the argu-
ment from love, a similar approach should also work for many of the other pro-passibilism 
arguments. For example, some philosophers have argued for passibilism from God’s omni-
science: in order for God to know everything, he must know what it is like to suffer, but the 
only way to know what it is like to suffer is to have suffered (Brown, “The Problem of Pain”; 
Hartshorne, Man’s Vision of God, 163; Sarot, God, Passibility, and Corporeality, 68–77; Ward, 
Religion and Creation, 242–255). To this argument, the impassibilist can respond that while we 
cannot conceive of any way of knowing what it is like to suffer without having suffered, that 
does not prove it is impossible for God. If the passibilist insists that the connection between 
knowing what it is like to suffer and having suffered is an analytic one, and hence that it is 
logically impossible to know what it is like to suffer without having suffered, the impassi-
bilist can respond that strictly, God shknows rather than knows everything, where shknowing 
is exactly like knowing in every respect that is important to us, but unlike knowing, never 
requires first-hand experience. The analogical extension this would require is so minor that 
no one could reasonably take it to constitute an abandonment of the doctrine that God is 
omniscient.
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love* us, and vice versa. However, this inconsistency is not an indictment 
of my proposal, but simply a reflection of the human incapacity to com-
prehend a God who is vastly greater than and thus vastly unlike us. We 
ought to expect that the pieces of knowledge about God we receive from 
revelation and reason will not all fit neatly together like the pieces of a 
puzzle. That could happen only if God were sufficiently like created things 
to be properly comprehensible to us.
Consider, for comparison, the way one explains atoms to beginning 
students. One tells the student that air is not, as they might think, empty 
space, but rather that it consists of very tiny balls bouncing around in 
empty space. However, if a particularly clever student were to ask par-
ticularly clever questions, we would be forced to acknowledge that this 
picture has been simplified somewhat. Atoms are not actually just tiny 
versions of macroscopic objects like billiard balls. A physical object in the 
familiar sense is made of atoms packed close together, but an atom is not 
made up of atoms, so it cannot be a physical object in the familiar sense. 
Similarly, physical objects in the familiar sense have colors (or else are 
transparent), but atoms do not have colors (and not by virtue of being 
transparent). To describe atoms as tiny balls is to speak analogically. A 
very clever student indeed might thus adopt the following position which 
runs precisely parallel to the position I have proposed that we take about 
God’s love:
(A1) Physical objects* are made up of atoms.
(A2) Atoms are not made up of atoms and so are not physical objects*.
(A3) However, atoms are importantly and relevantly similar to very 
tiny physical objects*, so much so that to think of atoms as tiny 
physical objects* is to get something importantly right about at-
oms, even though it is also partly incorrect.
(A4) Right now I am not ready to understand the full truth about at-
oms (or my teacher is not ready to explain it to me), so I am unable 
to fully isolate the truth in the conception of atoms as tiny phys-
ical objects*, or to tease apart the aspects of the claim that atoms 
are tiny physical objects* which are true from the aspects which 
are false, in such a way as would render unnecessary any reliance 
on the muddled, partly-true claim that atoms are tiny physical 
objects*.
(A5) Therefore I ought to (at least for certain purposes) conceive of at-
oms as tiny physical objects*, while recognizing that this repre-
sentation does not fully align with the truth about atoms.
The student here has the word of a trustworthy authority that atoms are 
tiny physical objects in some important and relevant sense, and that it will 
work for most of her current purposes to think of them as such, and that it 
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will get at a lot of the truth about atoms to think of them as such. However, 
she can also see that atoms cannot actually be tiny physical objects in the 
sense of “physical objects” she currently grasps. But she lacks, at least 
for the moment, the resources to resolve this tension. In this hypothetical 
scenario, the five-point position I have sketched above would be, epis-
temically, the ideal position for her to take. While there remains a certain 
sort of tension in her thinking about atoms, it is an epistemically virtuous 
tension, rather than a sign that she has made some sort of mistake.
Those human beings who take scriptural revelation as the basis for their 
beliefs about God are in a closely analogous situation to this hypothetical 
student: we have the word of a trustworthy authority that God loves us 
in some important and relevant sense, but we also have strong reason to 
think that God cannot love us in the sense we currently understand, and 
we lack the resources to resolve this tension. Thus my analogous five-
point position about God’s love is the ideal one for us to take, just as my 
hypothetical student’s five-point position would be the ideal one for her 
to take about atoms.
Objection 2: The Analogy Solution Requires us to Deny that God Really Loves Us
The Christian scriptures assert that God is Love—not merely that God is 
similar to Love, or that it is good to conceive of God as Love. Does not my 
proposal require us to deny that God actually loves us—and is this not 
theologically unacceptable?
My response is that my position does not deny that God loves us. It 
denies that God loves* us. That is, my position denies that God has the 
particular kind of love which certain passibilists have (plausibly) picked 
out as the highest form of love we can conceive of—a form of love which 
involves vulnerability to suffering. But this is compatible with thinking 
that God nonetheless loves us in the actual highest and truest sense of 
the word.
I am appealing here to something like Aquinas’s theory of divine pred-
ication.27 For Aquinas, predicates applied to God are (at best) analogical, 
and don’t mean the same thing when said of God that they mean when 
said of human beings. But because God is the source of all human perfec-
tions, we know that God must himself possess the highest possible form 
of all those perfections. Thus, although God is not “good” or “just” in the 
same sense of those words as a human being is, that does not mean that 
God is merely similar to a good and just thing. To say that would imply that 
it is human beings who are truly good and just, and that God is good or 
just in only a lesser analogical sense, and that would clearly be a theolog-
ically unacceptable position.
On the contrary, Aquinas insists, it is God who is truly good and just in 
the (ontologically) primary senses of those words; it is human beings who 
are good in only a lesser, secondary sense. Aquinas is a sort of semantic 
27See esp. Summa Theologiae I q.13 a.5–6. 
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externalist: he does not think the meaning of a word consists solely in the 
concepts we attach to the word in our own minds. If love is a real perfec-
tion which exists in its perfect form in God and in a derivative, muddled, 
and imperfect form in creatures, then our word “love” refers to the perfec-
tion itself, and thus more properly to divine love than to human love. This 
will be so even if our own concepts of love only adequately correspond 
to human love and are inaccurate as representations of divine love. Our 
own mental contents are not all that determine the proper referents of our 
words. Given this point, it is coherent to posit that my own concepts of 
love do not properly apply to God but that God nonetheless really does 
love us—i.e., that the most proper referent of the term “love” exists in God. 
My proposal is that the believer trust (on the basis of scriptural revelation) 
that the true perfection picked out by the word “love” exists in God, de-
spite the fact that our highest and best concepts of love do not successfully 
represent anything that exists in God.
Objection 3: The Analogy Solution Requires Us to Think of God as Passible and 
Thus Imperfect
On the other hand, one might worry that my position fails to satisfy the 
impassibilist half of the dilemma. I have proposed that we grant the im-
passibilist position that God does not suffer. But my position requires that 
we conceive of God as vulnerable to suffering, and isn’t this almost as bad 
as actually believing that God suffers? If the view that God is vulnerable 
to suffering renders God imperfect and perhaps even pitiable, doesn’t 
thinking of God as vulnerable to suffering require us to think of God as 
imperfect and perhaps even pitiable? If so, it’s not clear that this is any 
improvement over wholehearted passibilism.
However, while to think of God as loving* us does require us to think 
of God as vulnerable to suffering in some sense, it does not require us to 
think of God that way at all times, in all respects, or for all purposes. What 
I propose is that we think of God as vulnerable to suffering only insofar as 
we are thinking of God as loving* us, since thinking of God as vulnerable 
to suffering is an inescapable element of thinking of God as loving* us. But 
we should not think of God as vulnerable to suffering under that concept 
itself. Furthermore, since we do not actually believe that God is vulnerable 
to suffering, we should refrain from deducing any conclusions from the 
claim that God is vulnerable to suffering. Thus, while I think of God as 
loving* us, if this way of thinking leads me to explicitly think of God as 
experiencing great suffering, and thus to pity God, I will remind myself 
that the claim that God loves* us is only an analogy, and that these are 
respects in which the analogy doesn’t hold.
Objection 4: The Analogy Solution Requires Us to Conceive of God Falsely
I have proposed that we think of God as loving* us, despite the fact that 
God does not love* us. That is, I have proposed that we conceive of God as 
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something he is not. Is it not wrong to deliberately encourage in oneself a 
conception of God which is unveridical?
All else being equal, it is better to conceive of things as they in fact are. 
However, that could serve as an objection against my view only if it were 
possible for us to conceive of God as he is. But if one accepts the premises 
of my argument in Section 3, it is not possible for us to form a positive 
conception of God as he is, at least not with respect to the specific issue 
of God’s love. It is possible for us to describe God as he is: for example, 
we can correctly describe God as having something similar to love*, but 
without being vulnerable to suffering. One could adopt this description 
without adopting any conception of God as loving*. But to have a robust 
theistic faith seems to require that one have not merely a description of 
God one accepts as true in the abstract, but also a positive conception of the 
God to whom one prays and devotes oneself. And given the centrality of 
God’s love in the Christian scriptures, it seems at least highly preferable to 
have not merely some or other positive conception of God, but specifically 
some positive conception of God as loving us.
But if the passibilist is right that love* is the highest form of love we 
can conceive of, then if we want a conception of God which specifically 
addresses the matter of God’s love, our options are limited. Our options 
are to conceive of God as
(1) a personal being who loves* us
(2) a personal being who loves us in some lesser way—for instance, 
who is benevolent and seeks union with us, but without caring 
about us in such a way as to suffer when bad things happen to us 
or when we reject union with him
(3) a personal being who does not love us in any way, or
(4) a non-personal being who, consequently, does not love us in any 
way.
Assuming that the highest form of love we can conceive of involves vul-
nerability to suffering, the above list sums up all the available options: 
any positive conception of God one could have that addresses the issue of 
God’s love would fall into one of those four categories.
On the theological position I assumed in Section 3, none of these con-
ceptions of God is accurate. (1) is inaccurate because it suggests that God 
is vulnerable to suffering, (2) is inaccurate because it suggests that God 
loves us only in a weakened or less robust sense, and (3) and (4) are inac-
curate because they suggest that God has nothing remotely like love for 
us. It is plausible that, from among these options, (1) could be the closest 
to the truth. (1) might be the image that best represents God as he is, given 
our particular human perspectives, interests, and limitations. Conceiving 
of God as loving* us, while simultaneously believing that this conception 
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is partly inaccurate, may be the closest we can possibly get to conceiving 
of God rightly.
Thus, if my premises are correct—if it is true that God is invulnerable 
to suffering, that God loves us in the (actual) highest and best sense of the 
word, and that the highest form of love we are able to conceive of is one 
that involves vulnerability to suffering—then the position I have sketched 
in this paper would constitute the best epistemic position available to 
the believer. To be a simple impassibilist would allow one to have all the 
correct beliefs, but would leave one impoverished with respect to one’s 
conception of God, because a simple impassibilist could conceive of God as 
loving only in a weakened sense of the word. On the other hand, while the 
simple passibilist would have the advantage of possessing the best and 
most veridical conception of God available to human beings, that comes at 
the cost of holding the false belief that God suffers. Those who adopt my 
proposed analogical solution take the advantages of both positions and 
the disadvantages of neither, at the modest cost of some internal tension 
in our ways of thinking about God.
5. Conclusion
Despite its advantages, I expect that my proposal may leave some readers 
feeling dissatisfied. To appeal to analogy in the way I propose amounts to 
admitting that, in one important sense, one does not know exactly what 
one is saying when one talks about God. And that is hardly the sort of 
position the average philosopher is eager to adopt. But to simply rule out 
the possibility that an appeal to analogy might be necessary would be 
unjustified arrogance in the context of theology. It seems entirely plausible 
that there could be important truths about God which are literally incon-
ceivable to human beings. And it also seems plausible, given a roughly 
personalist conception of God, that God might nonetheless condescend 
to communicate approximations of these truths to us, analogically, in 
something like the way we communicate truths about atoms to beginning 
students. And if such a thing has happened, a policy of avoiding appeals 
to analogy because they are somewhat unsatisfying in form would be a 
terribly misguided one. When theologians and philosophers of religion 
find themselves between a rock and a hard place, where none of the 
(non-analogical) theological options seems appropriate, an appeal to 
analogy may be not only the most theologically agreeable solution, but 
also the most reasonable.28
University of Notre Dame
28A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2018 Graduate Research Confer-
ence at the University of Chicago, and I am grateful to members of the audience for their 
questions and comments. I am also indebted to Jim Conant, Michael Kremer, Mark Murphy, 
Josef Stern, and two anonymous referees for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of the paper.
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